The Future of Communications in Denied Environments: Post-IP Networking and Cryptographic Resilience

Modern battlefields are defined by contested and denied communications environments. Near-peer adversaries employ aggressive electronic warfare – jamming radio frequencies, intercepting signals, and even cyberattacks – all to disrupt the flow of information. In such scenarios, conventional networking based on the Internet Protocol (IP) and centralized infrastructure can falter. Units can find themselves “off the grid” with satellites jammed or destroyed, cellular networks down, and traditional radios compromised. For example, during the Ukraine conflict, frontline troops faced Russian electronic jamming so intense that new jam-resistant radios had to be developed. 

Defence professionals and tactical network engineers are now re-imagining how to maintain secure, reliable connectivity when the usual rules of networking no longer apply. The future of military communications lies in moving beyond the legacy internet model – embracing mesh-based, ad-hoc networks, new transport protocols not reliant on DNS or centralized address assignment, and hardened cryptographic schemes that even quantum computers can’t crack. This article explores how post-IP networking and cryptographic resilience are emerging as twin pillars of next-generation tactical communications. We will delve into mesh networking and MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks) for infrastructure-free connectivity, hybrid transport layers to defeat jamming, and advances in encryption (from agile ciphers to quantum-resistant algorithms) that safeguard comms at the tactical edge. These developments, while rarely discussed outside specialist circles, carry massive implications for future conflicts – offering militaries a path to unbreakable communications even in denied environments.

Post-IP Networking: A New Battlefield Paradigm

When communications are heavily contested, networks must operate autonomously, without the crutch of traditional internet infrastructure. Post-IP networking refers to architectures that do not depend on the Internet Protocol suite (IP addresses, TCP/UDP, DNS, etc.) in the conventional manner. Instead, they leverage alternative protocols and addressing schemes better suited to mission-critical resilience. The rationale is simple: IP networks were designed for civil use with assumed stable links and centralized resources – assumptions that break down under jamming, infrastructure loss, or deliberate cyber attack. In a jamming-heavy conflict, sticking purely to IP-based comms can be a liability. Adversaries know the protocols and frequencies to target. By moving to post-IP approaches, militaries can become more unpredictable and robust in the electromagnetic spectrum.

One example of an emerging post-IP framework is Reticulum, an open-source, cryptography-centric networking stack built specifically for resilient comms in austere conditions. Reticulum does not rely on traditional IP addressing or centralised DNS at all – in fact, it doesn’t even include source addresses in packets. There is no central authority managing the address space; nodes self-assign their addresses as needed and new addresses become reachable across the network within seconds. This means a Reticulum-based network can form on the fly, without any pre-existing infrastructure or coordination – ideal for battlefield units that need to set up communications in an infrastructure-denied scenario. Addresses are self-sovereign and portable, so a device can physically move and still keep its network identity. All routing is done through cryptographic identifiers, not IP numbers, eliminating the need for DNS lookups or IP registry. In essence, Reticulum enables completely decentralised, autonomous networks that can scale from local platoon level up to theater-wide, without ever touching the Internet. Importantly, it was designed to cope with extremely low bandwidth and high latency, ensuring that even feeble signals (like low-bitrate long-range radio links) can carry at least some data. The protocol is agnostic to the underlying transport: it can run over radio links like LoRa or AX.25, UHF/VHF channels, Wi-Fi, or even be tunneled over IP if needed. This flexibility means a post-IP network can opportunistically use any available medium – a vital trait when certain bands are jammed or specific links go down.

From a security perspective, post-IP networks often bake in encryption and zero-trust assumptions at the core. In Reticulum’s case, all traffic is encrypted end-to-end by default, with no option for plaintext communication. Every link and packet is secured with strong cryptography, and ephemeral keys provide perfect forward secrecy – so even if one transmission is somehow compromised, it won’t compromise past or future messages. This contrasts with legacy military radio systems where encryption might be an add-on (and sometimes turned off for compatibility or simplicity). By removing the legacy baggage of IP, these new protocols can be designed from the ground up for resilience and security. No dependency on DNS servers, no fixed gateways, no single points of failure – post-IP networks are inherently more difficult to shut down. An enemy can’t simply take out a high-value node (like a DNS node or router) to collapse the whole network, because there is no central nexus – only a web of peer-to-peer links. This decentralised ethos is increasingly seen as a necessity for the disconnected, disrupted, intermittent, and limited (DDIL) environments of modern warfare.

Mesh Networks and MANETs at the Tactical Edge

One of the foundational technologies enabling post-IP communication in denied environments is the use of mesh networks, specifically Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs), at the tactical edge. In a mesh network, each node (whether a soldier’s radio, a vehicle, a drone, or a sensor) can directly communicate with others and also serve as a relay for third-party traffic. This creates a web of multiple routes rather than the hub-and-spoke model of traditional networks. Decentralised wireless mesh networking is ideal for tactical communications because if any node or link is destroyed, the data can automatically reroute via alternate nodes. The network essentially self-heals – providing continuity of comms under fire. Unlike a fixed infrastructure, there is no single failure that breaks the entire network; even if several nodes go offline, the remaining ones find new paths to maintain connectivity. This resilience is priceless in combat, where equipment will be lost and pathways constantly changing.

MANETs are a specific category of mesh network where every node is mobile and the topology may constantly shift. Each node in a MANET acts as a router, forwarding packets for others based on dynamic routing algorithms. Communication from source to destination often requires multiple “hops” through intermediate nodes, especially when distances are long or line-of-sight is blocked. Crucially, MANETs self-organize and self-configure – nodes can join or leave at any time, and the network adapts without human intervention. This makes MANETs extremely well-suited for military operations where units are moving fast, deploying in unfamiliar terrain, and cannot afford to manually reconfigure networks during maneuvers. Military mesh radio systems today are deployed for everything from dismounted infantry sections to inter-vehicle links and swarms of unmanned systems. They can operate as standalone local networks or integrate with higher-level communications (for example, a platoon’s mesh may uplink to a battalion via satellite or high-bandwidth backhaul when available).

Fault tolerance and anti-jam features in modern tactical mesh radios further enhance resilience. Advanced mesh waveforms can dynamically switch frequencies or hop across channels when they detect jamming or interference. This means if an adversary jams one frequency band, the network nodes can automatically coordinate to move to a clearer channel, maintaining the link. Such frequency agility (often combined with low probability of intercept techniques) makes communications much harder to shut down. For instance, the new generation of squad radios mentioned earlier use fast frequency-hopping spread spectrum and lower-power signals to evade jammers and detection. In practice, a well-designed MANET might have nodes constantly scanning and negotiating the best frequencies to use, on the fly, based on the current interference environment. This is a step beyond traditional fixed-frequency radios and even beyond older frequency-hopping radios that followed a predetermined pattern – modern mesh protocols can use cognitive techniques to adapt in real time.

Scalability is another strength of mesh networks. With careful protocol design, they can cover very large areas by daisy-chaining many hops. Each node effectively extends the range of the network by one more hop. Some cutting-edge systems boast support for exceptionally deep networks – for example, Beechat’s Kaonic encrypted mesh radio platform can handle up to 128 hops, meaning a message could theoretically pass through 128 intermediate devices and still be delivered intact. This kind of reach can blanket a battlespace without any external infrastructure, albeit at the cost of some latency. The fact that every radio becomes a repeater is game-changing: even small units behind enemy lines or in remote terrain can get a message out as long as a chain of friendly or allied nodes exists between them and a headquarters node. Mesh networks may also integrate a mix of static and mobile nodes – e.g., semi-fixed relay nodes placed on hills or aerostats to boost range, combined with highly mobile soldier and vehicle nodes moving through valleys. Together, these form a robust web of connectivity. Notably, mesh networking is not limited to ground forces; it can extend to aerial layer networks (drones, helicopters, tethered balloons) creating an overlaid mesh that links terrestrial units with higher echelons. By complementing or substituting for SATCOM and other infrastructure, tactical mesh networks ensure that even when an enemy tries to sever communications, the network finds another way.

Hybrid Transport Layers to Defeat Jamming

Even the most sophisticated mesh network can face disruption if an adversary is adept and powerful enough – for example, a near-peer enemy might blanket multiple frequencies with jammers or employ cyber techniques to confuse one channel. To counter this, the future of tactical communications is trending toward hybrid transport layers that utilize multiple communication pathways simultaneously. Rather than relying on any single radio link or frequency band, units will leverage a diversified mix – such as UHF/VHF radio, HF radio, line-of-sight microwave, and satellite – all integrated into one cohesive network. If one path is degraded, others are instantly available to carry the traffic. This concept is sometimes called a multi-bearer network or an integrated transport network, and it represents a shift from the traditional approach of having primary and backup links used one at a time.

In the past, military communications planning often followed the PACE model (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency), which meant you’d designate a main comms method, and only switch to backups if the primary failed. However, against advanced jamming and EW threats, this sequential failover method is too slow and brittle. As one U.S. Army analysis noted, in modern conflict the old PACE method “is no longer suitable” – a single transport method per network is likely to be overwhelmed by capable adversaries. Units that stick to one radio or one frequency until it’s jammed will find themselves periodically cut off. The future solution involves employing multiple transport methods at once, making communications far more agile and adaptive to threats. In practical terms, this means a tactical unit might concurrently utilize a mesh network radio for short-range data, a directional microwave link to a nearby relay, and an overhead satellite or drone link – all feeding into the same network service. The network will automatically route packets via the best available path at any given moment. If the enemy jams the UHF mesh, messages could divert through the satellite link; if the satellite is unavailable or being spoofed, the network could push critical traffic through a high-frequency (HF) radio link that can bounce signals beyond line-of-sight. Automated integration of all available transports into a single, unified network is the end goal. Such an approach was described as a way to negate most unit-level jamming, because even a theater-wide jammer cannot feasibly knock out every modality at once.

Military organisations are already experimenting with this kind of layered resilience. The U.S. Army’s Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) concept, for instance, emphasizes mixing legacy and emergent communications bearers into one system. A terrestrially based MANET mesh might form the backbone for tactical units, while linking to air assets via Link-16 or other tactical datalinks, and incorporating wideband HF as a backup to reduce dependence on satellites. The result is a mesh of meshes – a network-of-networks where information finds a way through. In such a design, no single jamming technique can completely silence a unit. The network can also dynamically down-scope to minimal bandwidth modes when under extreme duress, ensuring command-and-control messages still get through (perhaps via text or other compressed format) even if high-bandwidth feeds (like video streams) are temporarily choked off. The days of a commander relying on one SATCOM radio for beyond-line-of-sight comms should become a thing of the past; instead, every unit will have a suite of options that work in tandem. As the ‘Military Review’ noted, “the goal for tactical communications should be an automated integration of existing radio and network transport options into a single, unified transport”, which in testing has shown the potential to mitigate both localized and theater-wide jamming attempts. This multi-path strategy effectively forces the adversary to play “whack-a-mole” across the spectrum – an expensive and likely futile endeavor if our networks are smart and flexible enough.

Source: https://www.army.mil/article/178265/inflatable_satcom_antenna_provides_early_entry_mission_command

Warfighters are exploring creative new hardware to bolster communications in austere conditions. Pictured above, U.S. Army soldiers prepare an inflatable satellite communication system known as Transportable Tactical Command Communications, which provides expeditionary mission networking and situational awareness even on the move. Such innovations demonstrate the drive for agile, infrastructure-free communication solutions that can deploy rapidly in the field.

Cryptographic Resilience at the Tactical Edge

In denied environments, it’s not only about maintaining a signal – it’s also about securing that signal against interception, exploitation, or manipulation. Robust communications go hand-in-hand with robust encryption. Cryptographic resilience means that even if adversaries are listening, they gain nothing; even if they capture devices or transmissions, they cannot decrypt past or present communications; and even if future technologies (like quantum computers) emerge, our secrets remain safe. Achieving this level of security at the tactical edge is challenging but imperative. Militaries have long used encryption (e.g. NSA Type-1 certified radios with AES or proprietary algorithms) to protect sensitive traffic. However, the evolving threat of quantum computing is casting a long shadow over current cryptographic standards. Algorithms like RSA and ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) — widely used in military systems for secure key exchange and digital signatures — could be broken by quantum computers in the near future, given their vastly increased computational power. This is driving a global push toward Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC): new encryption and key exchange algorithms that are designed to be resistant to both quantum and classical attacks.

Defence organizations are already taking PQC seriously. The U.S. Department of Defense’s CIO for cybersecurity stated that upgrading cryptography ahead of quantum-enabled adversaries is a top priority. In practice, this means introducing quantum-resistant encryption algorithms into tactical communication gear within the next few years, well before quantum computers become mainstream. NIST (the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology) has been leading an effort to standardize PQC algorithms; lattice-based cryptographic schemes, code-based schemes (like those based on error-correcting codes), and multivariate polynomial algorithms are among the frontrunners. For example, lattice-based encryption and signature algorithms (such as CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, which NIST has selected for standardization) are believed to withstand known quantum attacks. Militaries will need to adopt these in everything from software-defined radios to encryption modules in command systems. One challenge is that PQC algorithms can be more computationally intensive or require larger key sizes, which is a factor in resource-constrained edge devices (like handheld radios). Nonetheless, the industry is responding – optimised implementations and even hardware accelerators for PQC are under development, some through defence R&D programs, to ensure that frontline troops can have quantum-proof security without sacrificing performance.

Beyond the algorithm choice, cryptographic agility and best practices are vital for resilience. Systems must be able to update or switch cryptographic algorithms if a weakness is discovered – a lesson underscored by past incidents where static encryption schemes were rendered vulnerable by new exploits. Agile, programmable cryptographic modules in tactical radios can allow on-the-fly upgrades or changes to encryption protocols, ensuring communications aren’t stuck with a compromised cipher suite. Additionally, forward-looking protocols like the earlier-mentioned Reticulum incorporate perfect forward secrecy (PFS) by default. PFS means that the compromise of a long-term key (say, a device’s key) does not compromise past session keys. Each session (or even each message) uses ephemeral keys that get erased, so an enemy who later gains access to a radio or intercepts its traffic cannot retroactively decrypt prior exchanges. This is hugely important on the battlefield, where devices can be lost or overrun by the enemy – we don’t want yesterday’s communications divulged because one radio fell into adversary hands. Ephemeral keys, frequent re-keying, and one-time pads for especially sensitive messages are all tools in the toolbox for cryptographic resilience.

It’s also worth noting the drive for low-probability-of-intercept encryption. Encryption itself doesn’t stop an enemy from detecting a signal, but techniques like spread spectrum and spectral masking can make encrypted signals harder to even detect, adding another layer of security. If the enemy cannot easily find or fix your transmission, they cannot jam or intercept it effectively. Thus, encryption in denied environments is not just about math and ciphers – it’s part of a holistic approach including stealthier waveforms and smart power management.

Finally, post-quantum readiness has a morale and deterrence aspect: it signals to adversaries that any attempt to stockpile our encrypted communications for future decryption (a tactic intelligence services might try, betting that in 10 years a quantum computer could decrypt today’s intercepts) will be fruitless. By deploying cryptographic resilience measures now, militaries ensure that the secrets on the battlefield stay secret, both in the moment and for decades to come.

Eliminating DNS and IP Dependencies for Autonomy

An often overlooked vulnerability in military communications is the reliance on external services like DNS (Domain Name System) and the broader internet addressing infrastructure. In civilian networks, DNS is critical – it translates human-friendly domain names to IP addresses. But on a disconnected battlefield network, DNS can be a weakness: it’s a centralized service that may not be reachable or could be spoofed by an adversary. Likewise, traditional IP address schemes assume a hierarchical, centrally managed structure (with routers, gateways, and possibly remote servers to assign addresses or coordinate subnet routes). In a fast-moving conflict, units cannot afford to depend on any external servers or pre-established IP plans that might quickly become outdated. Removing DNS and IP dependencies means designing communication systems that can function entirely stand-alone, with self-sufficient naming and addressing.

Post-IP networks, as discussed, inherently move in this direction. For instance, in a Reticulum-based network, there is no concept of DNS at all – nodes use cryptographic addresses and discover each other through the mesh without any central lookup service. Any node can allocate a new address on the fly, and it will be recognized by others within moments. This autonomy is crucial: even if cut off from higher headquarters or the global internet, a company or platoon can still form a fully functional network among their devices. They don’t need to register addresses or query any server to find each other. Similarly, naming of services or resources can be handled through distributed protocols or pre-shared dictionaries, rather than through DNS queries that an enemy could hijack. The implication of removing these dependencies is profound battlefield resilience. It means that even in the worst-case scenario – say an isolated unit deep in a jamming zone – their radios and devices can still communicate peer-to-peer, routing by identity or content rather than IP address.

Another aspect is security: DNS has been a vector for cyber attacks (think DNS poisoning, spoofing, etc.). By eliminating it in tactical contexts, you remove an entire class of risk. Adversaries cannot redirect your troops to fake servers or interfere with name resolution if there is no centralized resolution occurring. Instead, identification might be tied to cryptographic keys (e.g., you contact a node by its public key or a hash of it), which is far harder to spoof without actually compromising the key. Some experimental military communication systems and research projects have looked at content-centric networking where the focus is on requesting data by name (e.g., “send me the latest reconnaissance image for grid X”) and any node that has that data can respond, without needing to know a specific IP address for a server. Such models inherently bypass DNS and improve robustness – if one node with the data is down, another can fulfill the request. In the dynamic, fluid situations of combat, this could ensure information gets where it needs to go via any path or provider available.

Operationally, moving away from IP also helps with emission control and stealth. IP traffic often has a lot of overhead and signatures that can be recognised (like identifiable packet headers, handshakes, etc.). A custom post-IP protocol can be optimized to be minimalist and obfuscate its patterns, so it’s less easily recognized by enemy SIGINT units. It can also drop any extraneous chatter – for instance, many IP-based protocols periodically ping or advertise routes, which in a tactical scenario might just give away your position or waste spectrum. By contrast, a bespoke tactical protocol might operate quietly until there’s user data to send, and even then, spread it out to avoid patterns.

In summary, an autonomous network that doesn’t depend on DNS or traditional IP infrastructure is inherently more resilient and secure for the warfighter. It emphasizes local control (or edge computing in network terms) – every unit can set up and manage its own network addressing without higher HQ involvement. As a bonus, this approach simplifies coalition interoperability in denied environments: different national forces can quickly mesh their networks together on an ad-hoc basis by agreeing on a protocol, without needing to reconcile IP address schemes or share DNS info. Each network can route to the other because they’re built on dynamic discovery, not fixed infrastructure. In the chaotic early stages of a coalition operation or a high-intensity conflict, that agility can make the difference between an effective joint force and a communications meltdown. The future battlefield will favour those who minimize dependencies and maximise autonomy in their communication systems.

Conclusion: Towards Unbreakable Tactical Networks

As militaries worldwide brace for the possibility of peer conflict under contested spectrum conditions, the writing is on the wall: yesterday’s communication paradigms will not survive tomorrow’s denied environments. The convergence of post-IP networking and advanced cryptographic resilience offers a powerful answer to these challenges. By shedding the limitations of the traditional Internet model – with its central servers, fixed addresses, and fragile trust mechanisms – and by leveraging mesh-based, multi-path networks that assume nothing and adapt to everything, defence forces can achieve a new level of communication superiority. A platoon in the field will be able to maintain secure contact with allies even while jammers roar and satellites wink out, because their networking logic finds a way, hopping through a dozen nodes or switching waveforms in an eyeblink. Their messages will remain confidential and authentic, guarded by encryption that stands firm even in the face of quantum decryption attempts. Crucially, these innovations are not just theoretical. The technology is rapidly maturing – from fielded examples of jam-proof radios and inflatable satcom relays, to open-source protocols like Reticulum that anyone can deploy for sovereignty over their own networks.

For defence professionals and decision-makers, the imperative is clear: embrace and invest in these post-IP, cryptographically secure communication systems. It is not hyperbole to say that the ability to communicate under fire – to have the last network standing – could decide the outcome of a future war. The units that can coordinate when all others are cut off will have an incalculable advantage. Achieving this means breaking out of comfort zones of legacy tech and pushing forward with new concepts, rigorous testing in exercises, and interoperability trials between services and allies. The future of communications in denied environments will be defined by networks that heal themselves, routes that defy jamming, and encryption that outlasts the smartest hackers. By adopting a post-IP mindset and fortifying every link with next-generation cryptography, militaries can ensure that even in the most hostile conditions, their voice will be heard and their data will endure.

Key Takeaways for Resilient Battlefield Communications:

• Decentralisation: Favour mesh and ad-hoc networks with no single points of failure, so the network survives even if parts are destroyed. 
• Multi-Path Connectivity: Use multiple transport channels (radio, satellite, etc.) concurrently and seamlessly to nullify jamming and outages. 
• Autonomous Networking: Remove reliance on external infrastructure like DNS or fixed IPs – enable self-configuring, self-discovering networks that work in isolation. 
• Cryptography Everywhere: Encrypt all communications by default with strong, modern algorithms; utilize ephemeral keys and forward secrecy to limit damage from any breach. 
• Post-Quantum Readiness: Transition to quantum-resistant encryption (e.g. lattice-based schemes) in tactical equipment now, ensuring long-term security against emerging threats. 
• Adaptive Spectrum Use: Employ waveforms and radios that can frequency-hop, power modulate, and adjust in real time to avoid detection and interference. 

By adhering to these principles and fostering a culture of innovation, military communicators can build future networks that are virtually unbreakable. The coming era of warfare will test our communications like never before – but with the right technology and strategy in place, even a denied environment can become just another domain in which we prevail.

Sources:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2020/Blumberg-Int-Tactical-Network/
https://reticulum.network/
https://mews.river.cat/reticulum
https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news-details/defence/ukraine-conflict-ukraine-develops-jam-resistant-radio
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/pentagon-info-officers-top-priority-upgrading-cryptography-ahead-of-quantum-enabled-hackers/
https://www.mrcy.com/company/blogs/intercepted-communications-encryption-standards-defense-edge
https://beechat.network/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Kaonic-1S-radio-module-datasheet-rev-1.2.pdf